We consider multistage bidding models where two types of risky assets (shares) are traded between two agents that have different information on the liquidation prices of traded assets. These prices are random integer variables that are determined by the initial chance move according to a probability distribution p over the two-dimensional integer lattice that is known to both players. Player 1 is informed on the prices of both types of shares, but Player 2 is not. The bids may take any integer value.
Introduction. Modeling financial markets by repeated games with asymmetric information
Random fluctuations in stock market prices are usually explained by the effect from multiple exogenous factors subjected to accidental variations. The work of De Meyer and Saley (2002) proposes a different strategic motivation for these phenomena. The authors assert that the Brownian component in the evolution of prices on the stock market may originate from the asymmetric information of stockbrokers on events determining market prices. "Insiders" are not interested in the immediate revelation of their private information. This forces them to randomize their actions and results in the appearance of an oscillatory component in price evolution.
De Meyer and Saley demonstrate this idea on a model of multistage bidding between two agents for one-type risky assets (shares). The liquidation price of a share depends on a random "state of nature" Before the bidding starts a chance move determines the "state of nature" and therefore the liquidation value of shares once and for all. Player 1 is informed on the "state of nature", but Player 2 is not. Both players know the probability of a chance move. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider.
At each subsequent step t = 1, 2, ..., n both players simultaneously propose their prices for one share. The maximal bid wins and one share is transacted at this price. If the bids are equal, no transaction occurs. Each player aims to maximize the value of his final portfolio (money plus the liquidation value of obtained shares).
In this model the uninformed Player 2 should use informed Player 1's history of moves to update his beliefs about the state of nature. In fact, at each step Player 2 may use the Bayes rule to re-estimate the posterior probabilities of a chance move outcome, or, at least, the posterior expectations of a liquidation price per share. Player 1 could control these posterior probabilities.
Thus Player 1 faces a problem of how to best use his private information without revealing it to Player 2. Using a myopic policy -in which a high bid is posted if the liquidation price is high and a low bid is posted if this price is low -is not optimal for Player 1, because it fully reveals the state of nature to Player 2. On the other hand, a strategy that does not depend on the state of nature, while revealing no information to Player 2, does not allow Player 1 to take advantage of his superior knowledge. Thus Player 1 must maintain a delicate balance between taking advantage of his private information and concealing it from Player 2.
De Meyer and Saley consider a model where a share's liquidation price takes only two values and players may make arbitrary bids. They reduce this model to a zero-sum repeated game with lack of information on one side, as introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1995) , but with continual action sets. De Meyer and Saley show that these n-stage games have values (i.e. the guaranteed gains of Player 1 are equal to the guaranteed losses of Player 2) in finding these values and the optimal strategies of players. De Meyer and Saley demonstrate that as n tends to infinity, the values infinitely increase with rate √ n. It is shown that Brownian Motion appears in the asymptotics of transaction prices generated by these strategies.
It is more natural to assume that players may assign only discrete bids proportional to a minimal currency unit. In our papers (Domansky, 2007) , (Domansky and Kreps, 2007) we investigate a model with two possible values fpr liquidation price and discrete admissible bids.
We show that, unlike De Meyer and Saley's (2002) model as n approches ∞, the sequence of guaranteed gains of the insider is bounded from above and converges. It is reasonable to consider bidding with an infinite number of steps. We construct the optimal strategies for corresponding infinite games. We write out explicitly the random process formed by the prices of transactions at sequential steps. The transaction prices perform a symmetric random walk over the admissible bids between two possible values of liquidation price with absorbing extreme points. The absorption of transaction prices reveals the true share's price by Player 2.
In our works (Domansky and We show that if the random variable C p , determining the liquidation price of a share has a finite mathematical expectation E[C p ], then the values V n (p) of n-stage games G n (p) exist (i.e. the guaranteed gain of Player 1 is equal to the guaranteed loss of Player 2). If the variance
On the contrary, if the variance D[C p ] is finite, then, as n approaches ∞, the sequence of values V n (p) for the games G n (p) is bounded from above and converges. So it is reasonable to consider the games G ∞ (p) with an infinite number of steps. We explicitly construct the optimal strategies for these games. It is shown that the insider optimal strategy generates a symmetric random walk of posterior mathematical expectations over the set of positive integer numbers with absorption.
In section 2 we introduce the model of multistage bidding where two types of risky assets (shares) are traded between two agents having different information on the liquidation prices of traded assets. These prices are integer random variables that are determined by the initial chance move for the whole period of bidding according to a probability distribution p ∈ ∆(Z 2 )
over two-dimensional integer lattice that is known to both players . The described model of n-stage bidding is reduced to the zero-sum repeated game G n (p) with lack of information on one side and with two-dimensional one-step actions with components corresponding to bids for each type of assets.
It is easy to show that if the expectations of share prices are finite, then the values V n (p)
of n-stage bidding games G n (p) exist. The value of such a game does not exceed the sum of values of games modeling the bidding with one-type shares. This means that a simultaneous bidding of two types of risky assets is less profitable for the insider than separate bidding of one-type shares. This is explained by the fact that the simultaneous bidding leads to revealing more insider information, because the bids for shares of each type provide information on shares of the other type.
In section 3 we show that if both share prices have finite variances, then the values V n (p) of n-stage bidding games do not exceed the function H(p) which is the smallest piecewise linear function equal to the one half of the sum of share price variances for distributions with integer expectations of both share prices.
To prove this we define the set of strategies τ * (p) for Player 2 that ensure these upper bounds.
The strategy τ * (p) is a direct combination of Player 2' optimal strategies for the games with one-type risky asset. The initial bids are the integer parts of expectations for corresponding liquidation prices. At step t > 1, the bid for a given type of share depends on the result of bidding for this share type at the previous step. If the buyer was Player 1, then the next bid increases for one unit; if the buyer was Player 2, then the next bid decreases for one unit; if there was a tie, then the next bid remains the same.
This makes it reasonable to consider the bidding of unlimited duration without an artificial restriction given beforehand for number of steps. This bidding model is reduced to the infinite game G ∞ (p). We show that this game terminates naturally when the posterior expectations of both liquidation prices come close enough to their real values. We further show that the value V ∞ (p) coincides with H(p). It is observed that H(p) is the sum of values for infinite games with one-type assets studied in (Domansky and Kreps, 2009 ).
In section 4 we construct optimal strategies σ * for Player 1 that ensure H(p) for games G ∞ (p) with two states. We base this on the results for games with one-type assets and with two states obtained by Domansky (2007) .
The defined strategy σ * of Player 1 generates an asymmetric random walk of posterior probabilities by adjacent points of the lattice formed with those probabilities where at least one of the price expectations is an integer value. The probabilities of jumps provide martingale characteristics of posterior probabilities and with absorption at extreme points.
In section 5 we construct optimal strategies σ * of Player 1 that ensure H(p) for games G ∞ (p) with three states. The martingale of posterior mathematical expectations generated by the optimal strategy of Player 1 for the game with the three-point support distribution represents a symmetric random walk over points of integer lattice lying within the triangle spanned across the support points of distribution. The symmetry is broken the moment that the walk hits the triangle boundary. From this moment, the game turn into one of games with distributions having two-point supports.
Further we consider the games G ∞ (p) with prices given by arbitrary probability distributions 
where, for y < u < x, distributions p In section 8 we construct Player 1' optimal strategy in a bidding game for two types of shares with an arbitrary distribution having an integer expectation vector (k, l), as a convex combination of his optimal strategies for such games with distributions having not more than three-point supports. If the state chosen by chance move is (k, l), then Player 1 stops the game.
In this case he cannot receive any profit from his informational advantage.
If the state chosen by the chance move is (x, y) = (k, l), then he chooses one or two complementary points by means of the lottery with the conditional probabilities of these complements.
He then plays his optimal strategy for the state (x, y) in a game with a distribution having either two-or three-point support that is the state (x, y) and the chosen complement.
We get the solutions for infinite games with arbitrary probability distributions over a twodimensional integer lattice with finite component variances. Both players have optimal strategies. The optimal strategy for Player 2 is a direct combination of his optimal strategies for the games with one-type of risky asset. The value of such game is equal to the sum of values for corresponding games with one risky asset. Thus, the profit that Player 2 gets under simultaneous n-step bidding in comparison with separate bidding for each type of shares disappears in the game of unbounded duration.
As for the case with one-type of risky assets the appearance of a random walk of transaction prices is demonstrated. But the symmetry of this random walk is broken at the final stages of the game.
2 Repeated games with one-sided information modeling multistage bidding with two types of risky assets
We consider repeated games G n (p) with incomplete information on one side (Aumann and Maschler, 1995) modeling the bidding with two types of risky assets described in the introduction.
Two players with opposite interests have money and two types of shares. The liquidation prices of both share types may take any integer values x and y.
At stage 0 a chance move determines the "state of nature" s and therefore the liquidation prices of shares (s 1 , s 2 ) for the whole period of bidding n according to the probability distribution p over Z 2 known to both Players. Player 1 is informed about the result of chance move z, Player 2 is not. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider.
At each subsequent stage t = 1, . . . , n both Players simultaneously propose their bids, meaning prices for one share of each type, (i
The bids are announced to both Players before proceeding to the next stage. The maximal bid wins and one share is transacted at this price. Therefore, if i This n-stage model is described by a zero-sum repeated game G n (p) with incomplete information for Player 2 and with countable state space S = Z 2 and with countable action spaces At the end of the game Player 2 pays to Player 1 the sum
where s is the result of a chance move. This description is a common knowledge of both Players.
At the step t it is enough for both Players to take into account the sequence (i 1 , . . . , i t−1 )
of Player 1's previous actions only. Thus, a mixed behavioral strategy σ for Player 1, who is informed on the state, is a sequence of moves
where the move σ t = (σ t (s)) s∈S and σ t (s) :
is the probability distribution used by Player 1 to select his action at stage t, given the state s and previous observations. Here ∆(·)
is the set of probability distributions over (·).
A strategy τ for uninformed Player 2 is a sequence of moves
where τ t :
Note that here we define infinite strategies fitting for games of arbitrary duration. A pair of
where
is the s-component of the n-step vector payoff h n (σ, τ ) for the pair of strategies (σ, τ ). Here the expectation is taken with respect to the probability distribution Π (σ,τ ) . Thus we consider n-step games G n (p) with total (non-averaged) payoffs which differs from the classical model of Aumann and Maschler.
We also consider the infinite games G ∞ (p). For certain pairs of strategies (σ, τ ), the payoff function K ∞ (p, σ, τ ), given by the infinite series (2.1),(2.2) with n = ∞, may be indefinite. If we restrict the set of Player 1's admissible strategies to strategies with nonnegative one-step
against any action j of Player 2, then the payoff function of the game G m ∞ (p) becomes completely definite (may be infinite). Player 1 has many strategies, ensuring him a nonnegative one-step gain against any action of Player 2. In fact, any reasonable strategy of Player 1 should possess this property.
For the initial probability p, the strategy σ ensures the n-step payoff
The strategy τ ensures the n-step vector payoff h n (τ ) with components
Now we describe the recursive structure of G n+1 (p). A strategy σ may be regarded as a pair (σ 1 , (σ(i)) i∈I ), where σ 1 (i|s) is the probability over I depending on s, and σ(i) is a strategy depending on the first action i 1 = i.
Analogously, a strategy τ may be regarded as a pair (τ 1 , (τ (i)) i∈I ), where τ 1 is the probability over J.
A pair (p, σ 1 ) induces the probability distribution π over S × I, π(s, i) = p(s)σ 1 (i|s). Let
be the marginal distribution of π on I (total probabilities of actions), and let
be the conditional probability on S given i 1 = i (a posterior probability).
Conversely, any set of total probabilities of actions q ∈ ∆(I) and posterior probabilities (p(·|i) ∈ ∆(S)) i∈I , satisfying the equality i∈I q(i)p(·|i) = p, define a certain random move of Player 1 for the current probability p. The posterior probabilities contain all information about the previous history of the game, that is essential for Player 1. Thus, to define a strategy for Player 1, it is sufficient to define the random move of Player 1 for any current posterior probability.
The following recursive representation for the payoff function corresponds to the recursive representation of strategies:
Let, for all i ∈ I, the strategy σ(i) ensure the payoff w n (p(·|i), σ(i)) in the game G n (p(·|i)).
Then the strategy σ = (σ 1 , (σ(i)) i∈I ) ensures the payoff
Let, for all i ∈ I, the strategy τ (i) ensure the vector payoff h n (τ (i)). Then the strategy τ = (τ 1 , (τ n (i)) i∈I ) ensures the vector payoff h n+1 (τ ) with the components
The game G n (p), where n ∈ N ∪ {∞}, has a value
Players have optimal strategies σ * and τ * if
or, as in the notation introduced above,
For n ∈ N the values V n (p) should satisfy Bellman optimality equations:
The value V ∞ (p) should satisfy Bellman optimality equation:
For probability distributions p with finite supports, the games G n (p), being games with finite state and action spaces, have values V n (p). The functions V n are continuous and concave in p. Both players have optimal strategies σ * n (p) and τ * n (p). The value of such a game does not exceed the sum
of values for games modeling the bidding with one-type shares, where p 1 and p 2 are the marginal distributions of the distribution p. This follows from the fact that Player 2 can guarantee himself the loss that does not exceed this sum exploiting the direct combination of optimal strategies τ * n (p 1 ) and τ * n (p 2 ) for the single asset games G n (p 1 ) and G n (p 2 ) as a strategy for the two asset game G n (p).
Consider the set M 1 of probability distributions p with finite first moments
For p ∈ M 1 , the liquidation prices of both shares have finite expectations
Then, for "reasonable" strategies σ and τ ,
Therefore, the payoff of the game G n (p) with p ∈ M 1 can be approximated using the payoffs of games G n (p k ) with probability distributions p k having finite support. The next theorem follows immediately from this fact.
The values V n (p) are positive and do not decrease, as the number of steps n increases.
Remark 2.2. If the random variable C p does not belong to L 2 , then, as n approaches ∞, the sequence V n (p) diverges.
Upper bounds for values V n (p)
Here we consider the set M 2 (Z 2 ) of probability distributions p = (p(u, v)) over the twodimension integer lattice Z 2 with finite second moments
with the norm
, the random variables u and v, determining the prices of shares, belong to L 2 and have finite variances
The main result of this section is that, for p ∈ M 2 (Z 2 ), the sequence V n (p) of values remains bounded as n → ∞.
To prove this we define the set of infinite strategies τ (k,l) of Player 2, suitable for the games G n (p) with arbitrary n.
Definition 3.1. The first move τ
is the action (k, Set
H(p) is a continuous, concave, and piecewise linear function over
Its peak points are
, the values V n (p) are bounded from above by the function
For
, and τ (k−1,l−1) .
Proof. It follows from Proposition 3.2 that the following upper bound for V n (p) does not depend on n:
Consequently, for p ∈ L(k, l) the minimum in formula (3.3) is attained on (k, l), and the equality (2.2) holds. In particular, for p ∈ Θ(k, l), this minimum is attained on (k, l),
and (k − 1, l − 1). 
Solutions for games G ∞ (p) with two states
In this section we show that, for games G ∞ (p) with the support of distribution p containing two states z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z 2 , the value V ∞ (p) is equal to H(p).
A distribution with the support z 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ), z 2 = (x 2 , y 2 ) is uniquely determined with expectations fpr coordinates. For any point
[y] = v, is given with probabilities p
Without loss of generality we assume that one of these points is (0, 0). Thus there are two states 0 = (0, 0) and z = (x, y), where x and y are integers and x > 0. The distribution p pz z,0
can be depicted with a scalar parameter p ∈ [0, 1] -the probability of state z. For definiteness set y > 0.
Observe that the function H(p) is equal to the sum of values
of one asset games G 
Further we enumerate the points of the lattice D(x, y) in ascending order D(x, y) = {p i },
According to Corollary 3.4 the optimal strategy τ * guarantees to Player 2 the loss not exceeding the function H(p). Therefore it is sufficient to show that there is an optimal strategy σ * of Player 1 that guarantees him this gain at the break points of function H(p), i.e. for the initial probability p belonging to the lattice D(x, y).
Now we present a definition of first moves for the strategy σ * for p i ∈ D(x, y). Consequently the total probabilities of actions are
This first move is realized with the following conditional probabilities of action a
As the posterior probabilities also belong to the lattice D(x, y) this set of moves defines the infinite strategy σ * . The defined strategy σ * of Player 1 generates the asymmetric random walk of posterior probabilities of state z by adjacent points of the irregular lattice D(x, y) with the probabilities of jumps that provide the martingale characteristics for posterior probabilities and with absorption at the extreme points p 0 = 0 and p I = 1. For the initial probability p i ∈ D(x, y), one of optimal strategies of Player 1 is the strategy σ * of Definition 4.1.
For the initial probability p ∈ (k/x, (k + 1)/x) ∩ (l/y, (l + 1)/y) a unique optimal strategy of Player 2 is the strategy τ * = τ k,l , defined in Definition 3.1. Any optimal strategy for adjacent intervals is also optimal for points of the lattice D(x, y).
Proof. At first we show that the one-step gain of Player 1 corresponding to the first move σ * 1 combined with the optimal gain H at the points of posterior probabilities generated by this move and weighted by total probabilities of actions satisfy Bellman optimality equations.
For p i = k/x = l/y, the one-step gain of Player 1 corresponding to the first move σ * 1 in the game G ∞ (0, z, p) is equal to his gain in the one-asset game G
Here the minimum in the left part is attained at (k , l ) = (k − 1, l) and (k, l), and the minimum in the right part is attained at k = k − 1 k.
For this move, taking into account (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), we get min
Thus the Bellman optimality equation is fulfilled for a one-asset game. On the other hand, three points p i−1 , p i and p i+1 are situated on the same linearity interval of function V y ∞ (p), i.e.
Summing (4.5) and (4.6), and also taking into account (4.1) we obtain
i.e., for p i = k/x = l/y and for the move σ * 1 in the game G ∞ (0, z, p), function H satisfies the Bellman optimality equation.
For p i = l/y = k/x, the proof of this fact is analogous with replacement of x and y.
For p i = k/x = l/y, the Bellman optimality equations (4.5) are fulfilled for both oneasset games G x ∞ (p) and G y ∞ (p). Summing these optimality equations we obtain the optimality equation for the two-asset game G ∞ (p).
Thus function H satisfies the Bellman optimality equation for all initial probabilities p i ∈ D(x, y). Iterating this optimality equation and taking into account the fact that a random walk of posterior probabilities generated by the strategy σ * terminates in a finite mean number of steps, we see that, for the initial probability p i ∈ D(x, y), the strategy σ * guarantees Player 1 the gain of H(p i ).
Solutions for games G ∞ (p) with three states
In this section we show that, for games G ∞ (p) with the support of distribution p containing three states z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ∈ Z 2 , the value V ∞ (p) coincides with H(p).
We assume that three points
Notice that arithmetical operations with subscripts are fulfilled in modulo 3.
A distribution with the support z 1 , z 2 , z 3 is uniquely determined with expectations of coor-
such that
is given with probabilities
Observe that
According to Corollary 3.4 the optimal strategy τ * guarantees Player 2 the loss not exceeding with w = (u, v) ∈ Z 2 and at the boundary of (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ). Therefore this is sufficient to show that there is a strategy σ * for Player 1 that guarantees him H(p
For the point w = (u, v) ∈ Z 2 that belongs to the triangle (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 )
with w = (u, v) ∈ Z 2 , the first step of strategy σ * may efficiently use the actions
With the help of these actions Player 1 can perform moves such that the modulus of difference between the posterior expectations of each coordinate and its initial expectation is not more than one.
There are several types of optimal first moves for Player 1. In particular, the first moves 
, 1). 
The total probabilities of actions are
This move is realized with the conditional probabilities of actions:
Remark. The martingale of posterior expectations generated by the optimal strategy of Player 1 is a symmetric random walk over the adjacent points of the lattice Z 2 disposed inside the triangle (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ). The symmetry of this random walk is broken at the moment when it hits the triangle boundary. Beginning from this moment the game degenerates into one of two-point games with the distribution support being either
If a < 1, then after observing the action 0 the next game is G ∞ (p
) with the probabilities of states
.
If b < 1, then after observing the action −e the next game is
) is equal to the function H(p)
given by (3.2). Both players have optimal strategies.
The optimal strategy for Player 2 is given by Definition 3.1.
For w = (u, v) ∈ Z 2 , one of optimal strategies of Player 1 is the strategy σ * of Definition 4.1.
Proof. Taking The corresponding one-step gain of Player 1 is equal to 2ab/(b + a). In fact,
For actions (0, −1) and (−1, 0) of Player 2 the proof is analogous.
It follows from (5.1) and (5.2) that
;
We get
i.e., for p 0 z 1 ,z 2 ,z 3
and for the move σ
), function H satisfies Bellman optimality equation.
Decompositions of univariate distributions as patterns for bivariate distributions
We now consider the games G ∞ (p) with prices given by arbitrary probability distributions p ∈ ∆(Z 2 ). We get the solution for the games G ∞ (p) as combinations of the solutions of games with two and three states that were obtained in sections 4 and 5. To study this idea, in sections 6 and 7 we construct symmetric representations of distributions over R 2 with the given mean values as convex combinations of distributions with supports containing not more than three points and with the same mean values.
We investigate the set P(R 2 ) of probability distributions p over the plane R 2 = {z = (x, y)} with finite first absolute moments
We denote mean values of the distribution p by E p [x] and E p [y]:
We construct symmetric representations of convex sets of distributions with given mean values
as convex hulls of their extreme points, which are distributions with supports containing not more than three points and with the same mean values. For extreme points of convex sets of distributions with the given moments see Winkler (1988) .
As a pattern we take the symmetric representation of one-dimensional probability distributions over the integer lattice that was used in Domansky and Kreps (2009) for an analysis of bidding models with single-type asset. Let p be a probability distribution over the set of integers Z 1 with zero mean value. Then
where p 0 k,−l is the probability distribution with the support {−l, k} and with zero mean value. The representation (1) allows to reduce solving models with prices of assets given by arbitrary probability distributions over Z 1 to solving such models with two-point distributions.
Formula (6.1) becomes more transparent if we take into account the equality
Coefficients of decomposition (6.1) take a "symmetric" form
We mean just this form of coefficients saying that the representation (6.1) is symmetric. We aim for constructing an analogous representation of bivariate probability distributions.
We treat coefficients P p (p 0 k,−l ) of decomposition (6.1) as probabilities of extreme distributions with two-point supports. The probability of such distribution is proportional to the span of its support and to the probabilities of both support points. Choosing a point in accordance with a distribution p can be understood by means of two-step lottery: the first step chooses an extreme distribution and the second step chooses a point in its support. This treatment allows us to calculate the conditional probabilities of complementary points given one point −l or k in a support of extreme distribution. We get
Thus the conditional probability is the same for all given points on a half-line. It is proportional to the point probability and to its distance from the origin. This property is characteristic for this decomposition. In fact, if P p (p 0 k,−l ) is a probability distribution such that (6.3) is fulfilled, then
and therefore we get (6.1). Formula (6.1) can be written as
This formula can be easily generalized for probability distributions over the set of real numbers R 1 with the zero mean value. Namely One of the steps of Skorohod's proof consists of a demonstration that any centered probability distribution on the real line can be disintegrated into centered distributions supported at two points each. Skorokhod employs another decomposition formula that works only for distributions with continuous distribution functions. In fact, the formula (6.4) can be employed as well.
Any centered probability distribution p on the real line can be represented as the distribution of the random variable w(τ ), where w(t), t ≥ 0, w(0) = 0 is a Brownian motion, the stopping time τ is the minimal root of the equation (w(t) − χ)(w(t) + ψ) = 0, and the random vector
+ is distributed with probabilities
Obloj indicates that for the first time formula (6.4) was used in this context in the works of Hall (1968 Hall ( , 1969 . Kallenberg attributes employing the same formula to Chung (see Kallenberg (1997) , the proof of Lemma 12.4 in Chapter 12).
Decompositions of bivariate centered distributions
Here we construct symmetric representations of convex sets of distributions with given mean ∈ Θ(0, 0) with three-point supports (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ).
The distribution p 0 z 1 ,z 2 ∈ Θ(0, 0) with the two-point support {z 1 , z 2 } such that (0, 0) belongs to the interval (z 1 , z 2 ), i.e. z 1 = ae ψ , z 2 = −be ψ where e ψ is a unit vector with arg e ψ = ψ,
∈ Θ(0, 0) with the support {z 1 , z 2 , z 3 } such that (0, 0) belongs to the interior of the triangle (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) is given by
. All arithmetical operations with subscripts are fulfilled modulo 3. Using polar coordinates Consider the set ∆ 0 of non-ordered triples (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) that form triangles containing the point (0, 0):
The set ∆ 0 is manifold with a boundary. Its interior Int∆ 0 is the set of triples (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) ∈ ∆ 0 such that (0, 0) belongs to the interior of the (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ). Its boundary ∂∆ 0 is the set of triples (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) ∈ ∆ 0 such that (0, 0) belongs to the boundary of the (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ).
with the support {z i , z i+1 }.
For ψ ∈ [0, 2π), let R ψ be the half-line R ψ = {z : arg z = ψ(mod 2π)}. With each value ψ ∈ [0, 2π) we associate the set ∆ 0 (ψ) of non-ordered couples
Let Int∆ 0 (ψ) and ∂∆ 0 (ψ) be the sets of non-ordered couples (z 1 , z 2 ) such that, for z ∈ R ψ , the triple (z 1 , z 2 , z) belongs to Int∆ 0 and to ∂∆ 0 respectively. We take, that points (z 1 , z 2 ) are indexed counterclockwise. This implies det[z 1 , z 2 ] ≥ 0.
Using polar coordinates z 1 = (r 1 , ϕ 1 ), z 2 = (r 2 , ϕ 2 ) we get
The set ∂∆ 0 (ψ) can be naturally represented as a conjunction of three non-intersecting sets:
In other words, the set of couples such that (0, 0) belongs to the side (z 2 , z),
i.e. the set of such couples that (0, 0) belongs to the side (z 1 , z), and
i.e. the set of couples such that (0, 0) belongs to the side (z 1 , z 2 ) of the (z 1 , z 2 , z).
Now we introduce the value that plays the role of
Using polar coordinates z 1 = (r 1 , ϕ 1 ), z 2 = (r 2 , ϕ 2 ) and taking into account (7.1) we get
Consider the term
For the set ∂ 3 ∆ 0 (ψ) the integrand is equal to zero. The integrals over the sets ∂ 1 ∆ 0 (ψ) and ∂ 2 ∆ 0 (ψ) differ from zero only if the measure p(R ψ+π ) is more than zero. In this case
where e ψ is a unit vector with arg e ψ = ψ, and Hp ϕ is the half-plane
As p ∈ Θ(0, 0)
and
Taking this and (7.1) into account we get
The next fact produces the base for constructing symmetric representations of distributions over R 2 .
Theorem 7.1. For any distribution p ∈ Θ(0, 0) the quantity Φ(p, ψ) does not depend on ψ,
i.e. this is an invariant Φ(p) of the distribution p ∈ Θ(0, 0).
This theorem is a two-dimensional analog of the equality
that holds for p ∈ Θ(0) ⊂ P(R 1 ).
Corollary. For any distribution p ∈ Θ(0, 0) the quantity Φ(p) has the following invariant representation that is a bivariate analog of formula (6.2):
Now we will formulate the preliminary variant of the decomposition theorem for bivariate distributions. where Φ(p) is given by (7.2).
The last term of decomposition (7. 3) contains all distributions p
with two-point supports (z i , z i+1 ), where z i ∈ R ψ and z i+1 ∈ R ψ+π . In order for such combination of points to appear with nonzero probability, it is necessary that the measure p(R ψ ) and the measure p(R ψ+π ) be greater than zero. This is possible for no more than a countable set Ψ(p) of values ψ.
These considerations make possible the final formulation of the principal Theorem:
Theorem 7.4. Any probability distribution p ∈ Θ(0, 0) has the following symmetric representation as a convex combination of distributions with one-, two-, and three-point supports: Note that the extension of this methodology to higher dimensions is absolutely straightforward for centered distributions over R n that certainly do not include distributions with less than (n + 1)-point supports in their decomposition. These are distributions without linear subspaces of non-zero measure, or, if there is such subspace, then this subspace has a half-subspace of zero measure.
Any centered distribution over R n can be reduced to this form by subtracting a distribution that include only distributions with less than (n + 1)-point supports in its decomposition.
8 Constructing optimal strategies for Player 1
In this section we construct optimal strategies for Player 1 making use of the decomposition for the initial distribution p developed above.
The coefficients of decomposition may be treated as probabilities of corresponding extreme distributions with not more than three-point supports. The choice of a point on the twodimensional integer lattice in accordance with the distribution p can be realized by means of the two-step lottery: the first step chooses an extreme distribution and the second step chooses a point in its support. This treatment allows us to calculate the conditional probabilities of extreme distributions (i.e. one or two complementary points) given one point (x, y) = (k, l) in the support of extreme distribution. These conditional probabilities turn to be the same for all points of any ray starting at (k, l).
Consequently, the following algorithm gives the optimal strategy for Player 1:
1. If the state chosen by chance move is (0, 0), then Player 1 stops the game. 
